Agent based public audit for secured cloud storage
Keywords:
cloud computing, kernelAbstract
Operating system kernels typically enforce lowest restrictions on the applications permissible to execute leading to the power of malicious programs to abuse system resources. Malware running as standalone processes will freely execute enjoying the privileges provided to the user account running the method. Main stream software package kernels lack a robust and reliable mechanism for distinctive the running processes and binding them to the corresponding possible applications. Method authentication is completely different from method identification. Our supervisor call instruction observances are often integrated with existing obligatory access management systems to enforce application-level access rights. We tend to address the identification downside by proposing a unique secure application identification model within which user-level applications square measure needed to gift identification proofs at run time to be genuine to the kernel. Our supervisor call instruction observance is often integrated with existing obligatory access management systems to enforce application-level access rights.
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